


Appendix B



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Peter Cramton is Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland, Chairman of Market Design Inc., and President of Criterion Auctions. His research focuses on auctions, bargaining, and market exchange. Most of his recent work has addressed design and incentive questions in auctions and bargaining. He has served as an auction expert for numerous companies in spectrum auctions and electricity auctions. He has advised the FCC and several foreign governments on the design and implementation of spectrum auctions. Cramton has designed electricity markets in New England, Colombia, France, and Belgium. Before joining the Maryland faculty in 1993, he was an Associate Professor at Yale University and a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He has published numerous articles on auction theory, auction practice, and bargaining in major journals. Cramton received his B.S. in Engineering from Cornell University and his Ph.D. in Business from Stanford University.

Academic Positions

Professor of Economics—Department of Economics, University of Maryland, August 1996 to present.

Associate Professor of Economics—Department of Economics, University of Maryland, August 1993 to June 1996.

National Fellow—Hoover Institution, Stanford University, September 1992 to August 1993.

Associate Professor of Economics and Management—Yale School of Management, Yale University, July 1988 to August 1993.

Assistant Professor of Decision Theory—Yale School of Management, Yale University, July 1984 to June 1988.

Education

Stanford University, Doctor of Philosophy, June 1984, Graduate School of Business.

Dissertation: *The Role of Time and Information in Bargaining*.

Cornell University, Bachelor of Science with distinction, May 1980, School of Operations Research and Industrial Engineering. Graduated first in class.

Courses Taught

Advanced Microeconomics. Doctoral course in the foundations of game theory.

Game Theory. Undergraduate introduction to modern game theory.

Market Design. An advanced undergraduate course on auction and market design.

Microeconomic Analysis I. Doctoral core course in microeconomic theory.

Intermediate Microeconomics.

Negotiation and Competitive Decisions. Developed for management program.

Economic Analysis. Taught in management program.

Quantitative Analysis for Management Decisions. Taught in management program.

Theory of Choice II: Game Theory. Doctoral course in game theory with emphasis on information and dynamics.

Research interests

Auction theory and practice, bargaining theory, dispute resolution, incentives, contract theory, game theory, decision theory, labor economics, industrial organization, experimental economics, information economics, and law and economics.

Honors

Resident Scholar, Rockefeller Foundation, Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy, Spring 2007.

Departmental Undergraduate Teaching Award, Spring 1996(2), Spring 1997 and Spring 2002.

Departmental Graduate Teaching Award, Fall 1994 and Fall 1998.

Hoover National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1992-93.

Winner of the 1984 *Leonard J. Savage Thesis Award* for an outstanding dissertation in Bayesian Economics.

American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business Doctoral Fellowship, 1983-84.

National Association of Purchasing Management Scholarship, 1983-84.

Dean's Award for Service to Stanford University, 1983-84.

Two-time recipient of *Stanford Merit Fellowship*, 1981-83.

Elected by the Operations Research faculty as outstanding senior, 1980.

Affiliations

Econometric Society, American Economic Association, Society for Economic Analysis, and Society for the Promotion of Economic Theory.

Research on Auctions

"Market-Based Alternatives for Managing Congestion at New York's LaGuardia Airport." (with Michael O. Ball, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Frank Berardino, George Donohue, Mark Hansen, and Karla Hoffman), in *Optimal Use of Scarce Airport Capacity, Proceedings of AirNeth Annual Conference*, The Hague, April 2007.

"Colombia Firm Energy Market." (with Steven Stoft), *Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences*, January 2007.

"Simulation of the Colombian Firm Energy Market." (with Steven Stoft and Jeffrey West), Working Paper, University of Maryland, December 2006.

- "Spectrum Auction Design," Working Paper, University of Maryland, April 2007.
- "Why We Need to Stick with Uniform-Price Auctions in Electricity Markets." (with Steven Stoft), *Electricity Journal*, 20:1, 26-37, 2007.
- "The Convergence of Market Designs for Adequate Generating Capacity." (with Steven Stoft), Working Paper, University of Maryland, April 2006.
- Combinatorial Auctions, (with Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg) MIT Press, 2006.
- "Introduction to Combinatorial Auctions." (with Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg) in Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, 1-13, MIT Press, 2006.
- "The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design." (with Lawrence M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom) in Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, Chapter 5, 115-138, MIT Press, 2006.
- "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions." in Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, Chapter 4, 99-114, MIT Press, 2006.
- "Dynamic Auctions in Procurement." (with Lawrence M. Ausubel) in Nicola Dimitri, Gustavo Piga, and Giancarlo Spagnolo (eds.) *Handbook of Procurement*, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- "How Best to Auction Oil Rights." in Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), *Escaping the Resource Curse*, Chapter 5, 114-151, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
- "A Capacity Market that Makes Sense." (with Steven Stoft) *Electricity Journal*, 18, 43-54, August/September 2005.
- "Review of the Proposed Reserve Markets in New England." (with Hung-po Chao and Robert Wilson) White Paper, Market Design Inc., January 2005.
- "Auctioning Many Divisible Goods." (with Lawrence M. Ausubel) *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2, 480-493, April-May 2004.
- "Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets." *Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences*, January 2004.
- "Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing." (with Lawrence M. Ausubel) *Economic Theory*, 23, 493-505, April 2004. Reprinted in Charalambos Aliprantis, et al. (eds.), *Assets, Beliefs, and Equilibria in Economic Dynamics*, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 355-368, 2003.
- "Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets." Report before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, March 2003.
- "Rebuttal Addendum: Assessment of Submissions of the California Parties." Report before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, March 2003.

- "Electricity Market Design: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly." *Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences*, January, 2003.
- "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions." (with Jesse Schwartz) *Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy*, 1:1, www.bepress.com/beieap/contributions/vol1/iss1/art11, 2002.
- "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions." (with Lawrence M. Ausubel) Working Paper, University of Maryland, July 2002.
- "Spectrum Auctions." in Martin Cave, Sumit Majumdar, and Ingo Vogelsang, eds., *Handbook of Telecommunications Economics*, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V., Chapter 14, 605-639, 2002,
- "Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather." (with Suzi Kerr) *Energy Policy*, 30, 333-345, 2002.
- "Pricing in the California Power Exchange Electricity Market: Should California Switch from Uniform Pricing to Pay-as-Bid Pricing?" (with Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, and Richard D. Tabors), Blue Ribbon Panel Report, California Power Exchange, January 2001.
- "Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-Bid Pricing: A Dilemma for California and Beyond." (with Alfred E. Kahn, Robert H. Porter, and Richard D. Tabors), *Electricity Journal*, 70-79, July 2001.
- "How Affirmative Action at the FCC Auctions Decreased the Deficit," (with Ian Ayres) in *Ian Ayres, ed., Pervasive Prejudice? Unconventional Evidence of Race and Gender Discrimination*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 315-395, 2001.
- "Lessons Learned from the UK 3G Spectrum Auction." In U.K. National Audit Office Report, *The Auction of Radio Spectrum for the Third Generation of Mobile Telephones*, Appendix 3, October 2001.
- "A Review of Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 38, 627-633, September 2000.
- "Eliminating the Flaws in New England's Reserve Markets." (with Jeffrey Lien) Working Paper, University of Maryland, March 2000.
- "Review of the Reserves and Operable Capability Markets: New England's Experience in the First Four Months." White Paper, Market Design Inc., November 1999.
- "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions." (with Jesse Schwartz) *Journal of Regulatory Economics*, 17, 229-252, May 2000.
- "The Optimality of Being Efficient." (with Lawrence M. Ausubel) Working Paper, University of Maryland, March 2001.
- "The Role of the ISO in U.S. Electricity Markets: A Review of Restructuring in California and PJM." (with Lisa Cameron) *Electricity Journal*, 71-81, April 1999.
- "A Review of ISO New England's Proposed Market Rules." (with Robert Wilson) White Paper, Market Design Inc., September 1998.

Maryland Auction Conference, May 29-31, 1998.

"Auctioning Securities." (with Lawrence M. Ausubel) Working Paper, University of Maryland, March 1998.

Simultaneous Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding, (with John McMillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, and Robert Wilson) Report to the Federal Communications Commission, March 1998.

"Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents." (with Evan Kwerel and John Williams) *Journal of Law and Economics*, 41, 647-675, October 1998.

"The Distributional Effects of Carbon Regulation." (with Suzi Kerr) in Thomas Sterner (ed.) *The Market and the Environment*, Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, chapter 12, 1999.

"Ascending Auctions." *European Economic Review*, 42:3-5, 745-756, May 1998.

"The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions." *Journal of Law and Economics*, 41, 727-736, October 1998.

"Auctions and Takeovers." *New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law*, Peter Neuman (ed.), London: MacMillan Press, 1, 122-125, 1998.

Package Bidding for Spectrum Licenses, (with John McMillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, and Robert Wilson) Report to the Federal Communications Commission, October 1997.

Auction Design Enhancements for Non-Combinatorial Auctions, (with John McMillan, Paul Milgrom, Bradley Miller, Bridger Mitchell, Daniel Vincent, and Robert Wilson) Report to the Federal Communications Commission, September 1997.

"The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment." *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*, 6:3, 431-495, 1997. Reprinted in Donald L. Alexander (ed.), *Telecommunications Policy*, Praeger Publishers, 1997.

"Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions." (with Lawrence M. Ausubel, R. Preston McAfee, and John McMillan) *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*, 6:3, 497-527, 1997.

"Auction Design for Standard Offer Service." (with Andrew Parece and Robert Wilson) Working Paper, University of Maryland, July 1997.

"Using Auctions to Divest Generation Assets." (with Lisa J. Cameron and Robert Wilson) *Electricity Journal*, 10:10, 22-31, December 1997.

"Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition." (with Ian Ayres) *Stanford Law Review*, 48:4, 761-815, 1996.

"Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction." *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*, 4, 267-343, 1995.

"The Case for Affirmative Auction: From Conscience to Cooffers." (with Ian Ayres) *New York Times*, 21 May 1995, F13.

"Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation." (with Alan Schwartz) *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 7, 27–53, 1991.

"Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently." (with Robert Gibbons and Paul Klemperer) *Econometrica*, 55, 615–632, 1987. Reprinted in Paul Klemperer (ed.), *The Economic Theory of Auctions*, Volume 2, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2000.

Research on Bargaining

"ESOP Fables: The Impact of Employee Stock Ownership Plans on Labor Disputes." (with Hamid Mehran and Joseph Tracy) Working Paper, University of Maryland, September 2005.

"Unions, Bargaining and Strikes." (with Joseph S. Tracy) in John T. Addison and Claus Schnabel, eds., *International Handbook of Trade Unions*, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, Chapter 4, 86-117, 2003

"Bargaining with Incomplete Information." (with Lawrence M. Ausubel and Raymond J. Deneckere), Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart, eds., *Handbook of Game Theory*, Vol. 3, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V., Chapter 50, 1897-1945, 2002,

"The Effect of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strikes and Wages." (with Morley Gunderson and Joseph S. Tracy) *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 81:3, 475-487, 1999.

"Impacts of Strike Replacement Bans in Canada," (with Morley Gunderson and Joseph S. Tracy), *Labor Law Journal*, 50:3, 173-179, Fall 1999.

"The Use of Strike Replacements in Union Contract Negotiations: the U.S. Experience 1980–1989." (with Joseph S. Tracy) *Journal of Labor Economics*, 16:4, 667-701, 1998.

"Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents." (with Evan Kwerel and John Williams) *Journal of Law and Economics*, 41, 647-675, October 1998.

"Deception and Mutual Trust: A Reply to Strudler." (with J. Gregory Dees) *Journal of Business Ethics*, 5, 813–822, 1995. Reprinted in Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Michael Wheeler (eds.), *What's Fair*, John Wiley & Sons, 2004.

"Wage Bargaining with Time-Varying Threats." (with Joseph S. Tracy), *Journal of Labor Economics*, 12, 594–617, 1994.

"The Determinants of U.S. Labor Disputes." (with Joseph S. Tracy), *Journal of Labor Economics*, 12, 180–209, 1994.

"Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in Practical Ethics." (with J. Gregory Dees) *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 3, 359-394, 1993. Reprinted in Patricia Werhane and Tom Donalson, *Ethical Issues in Business: A Philosophical Approach*, Prentice-Hall, 1996, and Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Michael Wheeler (eds.), *What's Fair*, John Wiley & Sons, 2004.

"Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data." (with Joseph S. Tracy) *American Economic Review*, 82, 100–121, 1992. Reprinted in Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom, and Alvin E. Roth (eds.), *Game Theory in the Tradition of Bob Wilson*, Berkeley Electronic Press, www.bepress.com/wilson, May 2002.

"Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-sided Uncertainty," *Review of Economic Studies*, 59,205–225, 1992.

"Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs," *Management Science*, 37, 1221–1233,1991.

"Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality in Practice," (with J. Gregory Dees) *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 1, 135-167, 1991.

"Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms," in *Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining*, Alvin Roth (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Chapter 8, 149–179, 1985.

"Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-sided Uncertainty," *Review of Economic Studies*, 51, 579–593, 1984.

Other Research

"Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," (with Thomas R. Palfrey) *Games and Economic Behavior*, 10,255–283, 1995.

"Relational Investing and Agency Theory," (with Ian Ayres) *Cardozo Law Review*, 15, 1033–1066, 1994.

"Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty About Costs," (with Thomas R. Palfrey) *International Economic Review*, 31, 17–47, 1990. Reprinted in Stephen W. Salant and Margaret C. Levenstein (eds.), *Cartels*, Volume 1, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2005.

"Nonrandom Mixing Models of HIV Transmission," (with Edward Kaplan, and A. David Paltiel) in *Mathematical and Statistical Approaches to AIDS Epidemiology*, edited by Carlos Castillo-Chávez, *Lecture Notes in Biomathematics Series*, Springer-Verlag, 218–239, 1989.

Research Grants

"Dynamic Matching Mechanisms," National Science Foundation, August 2005 to July 2008, \$264,188.

"Slot Auctions for U.S. Airports," Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Transportation, September 2004 to August 2005, \$309,729.

"Rapid Response Electronic Markets for Time-Sensitive Goods," National Science Foundation, July 2002 to June 2005, \$2,000,000.

"Multiple-Item Auctions," National Science Foundation, July 2001 to June 2004, \$313,872.

"Auctions for Multiple Items," National Science Foundation, April 1998 to March 2001, \$318,175.

"Auctions and Infrastructure Conference," National Science Foundation, April 1998 to March 1999, \$25,000.

"Auctions and Infrastructure," World Bank, March-June 1998, \$25,000.

"Applying Strategic Bargaining Models to Union Contract Negotiations," National Science Foundation, April 1995 to March 1998, \$143,637.

"Applying Strategic Bargaining Models to Union Contract Negotiations," National Science Foundation, April 1992 to March 1994, \$177,760.

"Strikes and Delays in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data," National Science Foundation, April 1990 to March 1992, \$153,407.

"Gaming Exercises in Negotiation and Dispute Resolution," National Institute of Dispute Resolution, July to August 1988, \$6,000.

“The Role of Time and Information in Bargaining,” National Science Foundation, July 1986 to June 1988, \$40,000.

“Public Sector Cases on Negotiation,” Mellon Foundation, July to August 1985, \$12,000.

Editorial and Public Service

Journal of Industrial Economics, Associate Editor, 1998-present.

Member, RTO Futures (a working group of economists, executives, and government leaders to address critical issues in electricity restructuring), 2000-present.

Panelist, National Science Foundation, Economics, 1999-2002.

Panelist, National Science Foundation, Electricity Power System Efficiency and Security, 2002.

Program Committee Chair, *North American Econometric Society Summer Meetings*, June 21-24, 2001.

Panelist, National Science Foundation, Knowledge and Distributed Intelligence, 1998.

Referee for

American Economic Review, American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, *Econometrica*, *Economic Inquiry*, *Economic J*, *Economic Letters*, *Economic Theory*, *Energy J*, *Games & Economic Behavior*, *Group Decision & Negotiation*, *International Economic Review*, *International J of Game Theory*, *J of Business*, *J of Business & Economic Statistics*, *J of Conflict Resolution*, *J of Economic Theory*, *J of Economic Surveys*, *J of Economics & Management Strategy*, *J of Industrial Economics*, *J of Labor Economics*, *J of Law and Economics*, *J of Law, Economics & Organization*, *J of Political Economy*, *J of Public Economics*, *J of Regulatory Economics*, *Labour Economics*, *Management Science*, *Mathematical Social Sciences*, *Marketing Science*, MIT Press, National Institute for Dispute Resolution, National Science Foundation, *Omega*, *Operations Research*, *OPSEARCH*, *Quarterly J of Economics*, *Rand J of Economics*, *Research in Experimental Economics*, *Review of Economic Studies*, *Scandinavian J of Economics*, *Science*, *Social Choice & Welfare*, *Southern Economic J*.

Recent PhD Committees Chaired (Initial Placement)

Martin Ranger, May 2005 (Indiana University)

Jeffrey Lien, August 2001 (US Department of Justice)

Allan Ingraham, May 2001 (Criterion Auctions)

Jesse Schwartz, August 1999 (Vanderbilt University)

Laurent Martin, July 1999 (University of Washington)

Entrepreneurship and Consulting

Chairman, Market Design Inc. (with Lawrence Ausubel, R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan, Paul Milgrom, and Robert Wilson), a consulting firm that works with governments and companies in designing and implementing state-of-the-art auctions, 1995 to present (President since 8/99, Chairman since 9/03). Major projects :

- Design auction and suggest market reforms for British Columbia timber market.
- Design and implement auction to sell electricity capacity in France for *Electricite de France* and in Belgium for *Electrabel*.
- Design and implement auction to sell gas capacity in Germany and France.
- Design and implement U.K. auction to procure greenhouse gas emission reductions.
- Design and implement spectrum auctions in U.S., Canada and Mexico.

- Comment on design of spectrum auctions in Australia and U.S.
- Design and implement electricity auctions in California and New England
- Design auctions to divest electricity generation plants and power purchase agreements in U.S. and Canada.

President and Founder, Criterion Auctions (with Robert Crandall, Greg Sidak, and Hal Singer), a consulting firm that provides auction support services to governments and companies in high-stake auctions. 12/00 to present.

Chairman and Founder, Spectrum Exchange (with Lawrence Ausubel, Paul Milgrom, and Market Design Inc.), a firm to create value for the public by promoting the efficient exchange of spectrum. 12/99 to present.

Expert Reports, Affidavits, and Testimony

New England Power Pool, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Review of the Proposed Reserve Markets in New England." (with Hung-po Chao and Robert Wilson) Market Design Inc., January 2005.

U.S. Department of Defense, "Estimating Auction Revenues for the Proposed FCC Sale of 3G Spectrum for Broadband and Advanced Wireless Services." Criterion Auctions, December 2003.

Expert Report of Peter Cramton, *D.Lamar Deloach, et al. v. Philip Morris, Inc., et al.*, Civil Action No. 00-CV-1253, United States District Court, Middle District of North Carolina. October 2003. For R.J. Reynolds. Concluded that R.J. Reynolds did not collude in U.S. tobacco auctions during the class period.

Supplier Behavior in California Energy Crisis, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Docket Nos. EL00-95-075 and ELOO-98-063, "Competitive Bidding Behavior in Uniform-Price Auction Markets." March 2003. For Duke Energy.

Supplier Behavior in California Energy Crisis, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Docket Nos. EL00-95-075 and ELOO-98-063, "Rebuttal Addendum: Assessment of Submissions of the California Parties." March 2003. For Duke Energy.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Nos. FAA-2001-9852, FAA-2001-9854, "Comments on Alternative Policy Options for Managing Capacity and Mitigating Congestion and Delay at LaGuardia Airport." June 2002. Recommending auctions to manage congestion at LaGuardia.

Verizon Wireless Petition for Permanent Forbearance from CMRS Number Portability, Federal Communications Commission, WT Docket No. 01-184, "Declaration of Peter Cramton." February 2002. Comments in support of wireless number portability. For Leap Wireless.

ISO New England, Docket No. ER02, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Affidavit of Peter Cramton." February 2002. Comments on proposed changes to how the energy clearing price is calculated. For ISO New England.

2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits For Commercial Mobile Radio Services, WT Docket No. 01-14, Federal Communications Commission, "Ex Parte Declaration of Peter Cramton." October 2001. Further comments on the CMRS spectrum cap. For Leap Wireless.

ISO New England, Docket No. EL00-62-015, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Affidavit of Peter Cramton." June 2001. Comment on modifications to installed capability market. For ISO New England.

2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation Limits For Commercial Mobile Radio Services, WT Docket No. 01-14, Federal Communications Commission, "Declaration of Peter Cramton," April 2001. Comments on the CMRS spectrum cap. For Leap Wireless.

C and F Block Broadband PCS Auction, Federal Communications Commission, "Declaration of Peter Cramton," March 2001. Comments on the impact of fronts in the C and F Block Broadband PCS auction.

"Lessons Learned from the UK 3G Spectrum Auction," May 2001. **An** export report on the UK 3G Spectrum Auction. For UK National Audit Office.

"Market Effectiveness Assessment," (with Jeffrey Lien) May 2001. An expert report assessing the effectiveness of the electricity restructuring plan in Ontario. For Transcanada.

First Millennium Communications, Inc. and Barbara Laurence vs. Entravision Communications Company, No. 1420009074, "Expert Report of Peter Cramton," May 2001. Comment on the value of clearing rights for broadcast television stations 59 to 69. For First Millennium Communications and Barbara Laurence.

Pacific Communications vs. American Wireless, Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, No. 2000CV20099, "Reply Declaration of Peter Cramton," April 2001. Further comments on the impact of a delayed sale of spectrum license by Pacific Communication. For American Wireless.

Pacific Communications vs. American Wireless, Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, No. 2000CV20099, "Expert Affidavit of Peter Cramton," February 2001. Comments on the impact of a delayed sale ~~of~~ spectrum license by Pacific Communication. For American Wireless.

"Lessons from the United States Spectrum Auctions," Prepared Testimony of Peter Cramton before the United States Senate Budget Committee, February 2000.

New England Power Pool, Docket No. EL00-83-000, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Affidavit of Peter Cramton," July 2000. Comment on deficiency charge in installed capability market. For ISO New England.

NSTAR Services Company vs. New England Power Pool, Docket No. EL00-83-000, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Affidavit of Peter Cramton," June 2000. Further comments on energy price cap as a response to design flaws. For ISO New England.

NSTAR Services Company vs. New England Power Pool, Docket No. EL00-83-000, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Affidavit of Peter Cramton," June 2000. Comments on energy price cap as a response to design flaws. For ISO New England.

New England Power Pool, Docket No. EL00-62-000; ER00-2052-000, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Affidavit of Peter Cramton," May 2000. Comments on installed capability market. For ISO New England.

New England Power Pool, Docket No. EROO-2016-000, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Affidavit of Peter Cramton," **April** 2000. Comments *on* one-part vs. three-part bidding in energy market. For ISO New England.

New England Power Pool, Docket No. ER99-4536-000, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Affidavit of Peter Cramton," October 1999. Summary of review of reserves and operable capability markets. For ISO New England.

New England Power Pool, Docket No. OA97-237-000, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, "Affidavit of Peter Cramton," October 1998. Reply to comments on review of rules. For ISO New England.

New England Power Pool, Docket No. OA97-237-000, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “A Review of ISO New England’s Proposed Market Rules.” (with Robert Wilson), September 1998. For ISO New England.

Best Digital vs. U.S. West, American Arbitration Association, Denver Office, No. 77 181 00204 97, “Expert Report of Peter C. Cramton,” September 1998. Determine the value of spectrum licenses won by Best Digital in the C-block Broadband PCS auction. For Best Digital.

NextWave vs. Antigone and Devco, Petition to Deny License Proceedings, Federal Communications Commission, “Statement on the Effect of NextWave’s Participation in the C-block Auction on Antigone and Devco,” March 1997. For Antigone and Devco.

NextWave vs. Antigone and Devco, Petition to Deny License Proceedings, Federal Communications Commission, “Reply Statement on the Effect of NextWave’s Participation in the C-block Auction on Antigone and Devco.” April 1997. For Antigone and Devco.

Personal

Born on 12 November 1957

Married to Catherine Durnell Cramton